The Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Knick v. Township of Scott eliminated the requirement to exhaust state remedies before bringing federal takings claims, but what it did not do is offer a second bite at the apple to takings plaintiffs. The recently decided case of Warner v. City of Marathon may serve as a cautionary tale about potentially narrow windows for seeking relief after major changes in Supreme Court precedent.

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision demonstrates that while Knick opened the federal courthouse doors for some takings plaintiffs, it didn’t eliminate all the procedural traps that can ensnare the unwary, and it didn’t change basic principles about choosing whether to proceed in state or federal court. In this case, timing and choice of venue were everything—and the plaintiffs got it wrong, at least if they wanted to have their case heard in federal court.

Let’s start with the procedural backdrop. For decades, the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank required takings plaintiffs to exhaust state court remedies before bringing their claims in federal court. But in 2005, the Court decided San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, which held that state court judgments on takings claims have “preclusive effect” in later federal suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

Together, these decisions created what the Supreme Court in Knick called a “Catch-22”: a takings plaintiff couldn’t “go to federal court without going to state court first; but if he [went] to state court and los[t], his claim [would] be barred in federal court.” So the Court overruled Williamson County in 2019, allowing takings plaintiffs to proceed directly in federal court.

However, here’s the crucial detail: the Supreme Court left San Remo in place. That means if a takings claim is litigated to a final judgment in state court and the plaintiff loses, the plaintiff is still barred from federal court under basic preclusion principles. The plaintiffs don’t get to try their case in state court, and then try it again in federal court.

The plaintiffs in Warner found themselves in what seems like it is probably a relatively uncommon procedural posture created by the transition from Williamson County to Knick. They originally sued the City of Marathon in 2014 in federal court, and their case was eventually dismissed without prejudice by the federal court in 2018 under the then-existing Williamson County doctrine, with instructions to pursue their claim in state court first.

Here’s where timing became critical. Knick was decided on June 21, 2019, while the plaintiffs were still litigating in state court—but before any state court had issued a final ruling on their takings claim. At that moment, they faced a strategic choice: continue their state court case or attempt to return to federal court under the new Knick precedent.

They appear to have chosen to continue in state court as that is what they did. The state trial court granted summary judgment against them in March 2022, and Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal affirmed in January 2023. Only then—more than four years after Knick and after receiving an adverse final judgment in state court—did they attempt to reopen their federal case.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected their Rule 60(b) motion on multiple grounds. First, the court found the motion was not filed “within a reasonable time” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1). As the court noted:

Knick overruled Williamson County in June 2019, when no state court had yet ruled on the Plaintiffs’ takings claim. No state court would until March 2022. Yet Plaintiffs waited until four years after Knick, having fully exhausted their state remedies, to file in federal court.

More fundamentally, San Remo posed an insurmountable obstacle. Once the state court adjudicated the takings claim to final judgment, federal court review was precluded under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The plaintiffs had effectively chosen their forum and were stuck with the result.

The plaintiffs tried a few arguments to escape this but none succeeded:

Law of the Case: They argued that the Eleventh Circuit’s prior decision directing them to exhaust state remedies meant they could return to federal court after doing so. The court wasn’t buying it, noting that the prior decision didn’t address how San Remo would affect any attempt to reopen the case after a final state court judgment.

Inadequate State Remedies: They claimed Florida law provided inadequate remedies for takings violations. But the court found this argument waived and noted that the court had previously found Florida’s inverse condemnation procedures adequate.

So what’s the key takeaway? It’s not that one forum is inherently better than another—preclusion principles work both ways, and litigating to final judgment in any court generally forecloses relitigation elsewhere. If there is a unique lesson here, it seems to be that if you are in the unusual situation that a major supreme court precedent affecting your case and strategic choices changes during litigation, best practices would seem to be to reevaluate your case posture at the time that the precedent changes, rather than waiting. There may be a relatively narrow window to take advantage of the precedent change.

By: Jesse Davis, Pender and Coward Summer Associate 2025

The author is not involved in the litigation discussed in this post and expresses no opinion on the underlying merits of the claims.